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A process theory of competency rallying
in engineering projects
Abstract (142 words)
Firms face an environment changing at an increasingly rapid pace. Market
opportunities in particular can arise and disappear in a short time. Unfortunately, the speed
with which organizations can adapt their strategies and competencies to meet these
opportunities remains limited. We argue that firms can address these individual limitations by
cooperating with others for access to market opportunities and needed competencies. In this
paper, we present a process theory of how a network of firms can reliably engineering and
deliver products in the face of rapid market changes. In this theory, the success of the
network is predicated on 1) identification and development of competencies, 2) identification
and facing of market opportunities, 3) marshalling of competencies and 4) a short-term
cooperative effort. Our theory is based on the experiences of Virtual Factory, an organized
network for regional cooperation in the manufacturing industry.
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A process theory of competency rallying
in engineering projects
Firms face an environment changing at an increasingly rapid pace. Market
opportunities in particular can arise and disappear again in a short time. However, the speed
with which organizations can adapt to changes remains limited. We refer to this situation,
where the environment changes more rapidly than organizations can adapt, as a “turbulent
environment”. Turbulent environments re-pose two central questions addressed by theories of
the firm: How does the firm behave in its market? and How is work organized?
In stable environments, the answers provided to these questions distinguish two broad
types of theories of the firm. In the first type of theory—an outside-in perspective—markets
are assumed to determine the organization of work. This perspective is described in the
structure-conduct-performance principle [1] of the industrial organization school, which
contends that the existing industry structure calls for the adapted conduct of firms to achieve
the most competitive performance. It is the role of management to craft deliberate strategies
to translate industry realities into appropriate organizational structures. In short, ‘structure
follows strategy’ [2].
In the second type of theory—an inside-out perspective—existing structures explain a
firm’s market behavior. This perspective is conveyed by the resource-based view of the firm
[3]. While scholars refer to the resource-based view of the firm [3] in business writing, the
term “core competency” is in common use [4]. In any case, if these competencies are
valuable, rare, inimitable, and embedded in the organization, they define a resource barrier
and consequently, are a source of sustainable competitive advantage. In other words,
strategies are perceived to emerge from the organizational structure and culture as long-term
pattern of organizational behaviour [5].
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While both types of theories deliver fruitful alternative explanations of the nature of a
firm in stable environments, the two questions point to opposite ends of a paradox for firms
in turbulent environments. On the one hand, the insight of the first type of theory—that
deliberate strategy is necessary —remains true in the face of short-term market opportunities.
However, in a turbulent environment, as we have defined it, time constraints make it
impossible for firms to adopt appropriate organizational structures and routines to ensure
performance for each change in the market.
On the other hand, the insight from the second type of theory—that competencies
inside the firm are a source of competitive advantage—holds true especially for short-term
market opportunities. The more valuable a competency is, the longer it takes to develop
(often a decade or more [4]), so other firms can not readily develop competing competencies
to meet short-term opportunities. However, the unpredictable nature of market opportunities
in turbulent environments increases the risk that necessary competencies may be missing and
that existing competencies may become irrelevant or outdated. In short, turbulent
environments make appropriate strategy and competencies simultaneously more important
yet seemingly less attainable.
In this paper, we follow the suggestion of Poole and van der Ven [6] to resolve this
paradox by recognizing these theoretical insights as distinct phases in a process that unfolds
over time and across a network of cooperating firms. In the remainder of this introduction,
we describe how a network of firms can overcome the limitations identified above, before
turning to a presentation of our research approach and theory-building efforts.
Virtual organizations for competency rallying
We argue that one way for firms in turbulent environments to address their individual
limitations is to cooperate with others for access to market-opportunities and needed
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competencies. We use the term “rallying”, meaning, “to rapidly reunite for concentrated
effort” [7], to describe the process of developing and bringing together in temporary
cooperation a network of firms with the competencies needed to satisfy a newly-identified
market opportunity. The identification of competencies in the first phase of the process is
thus complemented in later phases by the identification of possible new markets and by the
quick recombination and connection of competencies held by different members of the
network, resolving the paradox described above.
While the potential value of such cooperation is becoming more widely accepted, the
details of competency rallying are little understood. The contribution of this paper is to
develop a process theory of competency rallying grounded in an action research study of one
successful virtual organization, the Virtual Factory (the “Virtuelle Fabrik” in the original
German). The basic building blocks of our process theory have been discussed before, of
course. For example, the role played by market recognition and competency recombination is
evident in the Prato region of Italy [8-10], in which many small textile manufacturing firms
specialize in various aspects of textile and apparel production, such as weaving, dying,
sewing, etc. These small companies are not able to identify worldwide customers, nor do they
offer a complete range of desired services. Instead merchants, impannatores, provide access
to the highly volatile fashion market opportunities for the entire industrial district [8] and
temporarily bring together numerous small companies to fill the requirements for each
particular contract. Similarly, Prahalad [4] notes that to develop competencies, they must be
used and re-used in many different markets and contexts. However, our theory is novel in the
way that it weaves together an external perspective on market-facing with an internal
perspective on competency development and marshalling to describe the overall process of
competency rallying.
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Following Weick’s [11] approach to theory building, we develop a relatively full
explanation of competency rallying in a small region, which is then used to guide a general
discussion of rallying in other settings. In the following section, we describe the particular
research setting, overall methodology and data collection. In the subsequent section, we
describe each phase of our proposed theory in turn. We conclude by discussing factors
important in the success of the Virtual Factory and lessons for further research using the
proposed theory.
Methodology
In this section, we describe the setting for our research project, the research approach
and the sources of data used.
Research setting: The Virtuelle Fabrik
Our study was conducted at the “Virtuelle Fabrik in Euregio Bodensee” (that is, the
Virtual Factory in the Lake Bodensee region of Germany, Switzerland and Austria), an
organized network for regional cooperation in the manufacturing industry. The Virtual
Factory routinely engineers and manufactures new products by recombining the
competencies of its members to meet short-term market opportunities. Members of this
network have cooperatively produced dozens of products and services, ranging from
machining simple parts to a complex module for a letter-sorting machine. Table 1 presents
several examples of projects worked on by the Virtual Factory and a brief description of the
way competencies from the network were rallied for these projects.
Insert Table 1 about here
Project leadership (the core partners) comprised entrepreneurs and senior managers
from companies in the region and four researchers from the Institute for Technology
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Management of the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland (including one of the authors as
the project leader). The researchers wanted to study new forms of organization in industry, in
particular, the role of virtual organizations in meeting the challenges raised by the changing
role of information technology and globalization of industries. Analysis before the start of the
project led the researchers to believe that existing theories only partly addressed the
managerial issues raised by these changes. Furthermore, they concluded that descriptive
research designs would be insufficient to bring to light the possibilities raised by these
changes. Instead, the project would need to develop and experiment on its own organizational
test bed.
Research approach: Collaborative action research
The research project was carried out as a four-year collaborative action research
project [12-14]. Action research is an interventionist approach to the development of
scientific knowledge (in contrast to more typical observational or survey approaches). To
understand the process of cooperation between the project organizations, the core partners
assumed the role of active promoters. Researchers acted partly as change agents in the firms
and partly as observers of the change processes, “alternating the change agent and researcher
roles” [15, p. 420, citing [16]]. To implement change, organizational development activities
took place in all participating companies and involved members at all organizational levels.
Action research was an appropriate methodology for this study because at the time it
started, the type of cooperation envisioned was not common. Indeed, at the time it would
have been difficult to identify even one real-world example of a virtual organization in high-
precision engineering and manufacturing, much less survey hundreds of examples. Therefore,
in order to study the process of cooperation in these organizations, the researchers had to be
involved in establishing the preconditions for it. More importantly, the researchers had only a
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general idea of how cooperation could be established, so the active participation of
practitioners from the member companies was necessary for the success of the project.
Susman and Evered [13] describe a five-phase cyclic process for action research,
consisting of 1) diagnosing, 2) action planning, 3) action taking, 4) evaluating and
5) specifying learning. Diagnosing includes identification of the primary problems that
underlie the organization’s desire to change and leads to the development of working
hypotheses about the state of the organization. In this phase, action researchers can use
techniques similar to organizational ethnography as a way to develop thick descriptions of
the dynamics and processes of the organizations involved in the project.
In the next phase, action planning, researchers and practitioners collaborate in
determining organizational activities to address the problems identified. This planning is
based on the theories and models brought to bear by the researchers as well as the knowledge
of the practitioners. In other words, the research may be both theory-driven and theory-
building.
In the action-taking phase, the planned changes are implemented. Being part of the
change process enables the researchers to be participant-observers in the processes being
studied. After the actions are taken, researchers and practitioners collaborate in evaluating the
outcomes. This evaluation includes determining whether the actions had the theoretically
expected effects and if they were effective in relieving the problems, a form of theory testing.
In the final phase, learnings from the actions and results are formally specified. This
phase distinguishes action research as a research method rather than simply a type of change
effort. Baskerville and Wood-Harper [17] suggest three audiences for these learnings. Firstly,
the participant organizations can be restructured to reflect the new knowledge gained in the
interaction. Secondly, where the change was unsuccessful or only partly successful, the
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learnings may lead to a new round of diagnosis and action planning. Finally, the test or
building of the theoretical framework in practice contributes to the development of scientific
knowledge.
The Virtual Factory project had three nested action-research cycles. At the shortest
time scale, innovations in specific projects were formally discussed at quarterly round-table
assemblies of the researchers and partners in the project. At the next level, external
workshops and conferences were organized roughly twice a year to present and discuss
project accomplishments with a broad industry audience. In total, approximately 1000 upper-
level managers from non-related companies attended these meetings. Finally, at the longest
time-scale, the project underwent three major funding cycles during the four years. Each
funding decision involved formal reviews of reports and proposals by a committee of
industrial and scientific reviewers assigned by the Swiss funding body (KwF, the
Commission for Scientific Research) and formal investment decisions from the project
companies.
Data collection and analysis
There are significant similarities between action research and other kinds of
qualitative research in the modes of data collection. The evidence guiding our descriptions of
and inferences about the process of competency rallying is divided into eight general
categories:
• Semi-structured interviews with company managers. The researchers conducted
nearly 100 semi-structured interviews to diagnose a variety of topics with company
managers. Interviewees included company directors, and managers and employees
involved in in- and outsourcing at all levels and departments (e.g., production,
finance, quality inspections, industrial engineering, purchasing, etc.). Each round of
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interviews lasted three to four days and resulted in a report describing the situation of
the firm.
• Questionnaires. Questionnaires were frequently used to collect data as basis both for
diagnosis of network activities (e.g., data about the business figures of the partner
companies) and for the very specific planning (e.g., to collect descriptions of the
resources available in the network), execution (e.g., to identify the expectations
towards customers and /or suppliers in outsourcing relationships) and evaluation of
action interventions (e.g., the number of proposals pending and number of orders
executed in the network at certain points in time).
• Project plans. The project was co-funded by the participating companies and the
Swiss Commission for Scientific Research (KwF). The project plans showed the
results achieved in the prior year, lessons learned from this work and the specification
of concrete actions for the year to come.
• Project meetings with partners. Regular meetings were held among the partners to
plan and take actions. Smaller formal meetings were held for parallel development
work. For example, the “rules of the game” and the profiles of the roles were
designed in this way. Researchers attended many meetings as change agents or to
follow the developments.
• Results of interventions. The action interventions produced both intended and
unintended results. Some of these results even appeared in parts of the partner
companies remote from the project interventions.
• Observations of projects. Partner companies executed numerous manufacturing
projects, about fifteen of which were directly observed by the researchers. The
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researchers followed the interventions, progress and difficulties encountered in these
manufacturing projects to feed the observation back to the partner companies as
lessons learned.
• Informal discussions. The researchers had hundreds, if not thousands, of informal
conversations with managers and employees of the participant companies, ranging
from brief interactions to long discussions over group dinners (known among
participants as the “virtual dinner”). Researchers talked with employees at all
hierarchical levels from all participant companies.
• Formal Reports. The researchers and managers regularly wrote up project results,
which were defined as sub-projects from teams and work-packages. In 1998 a book
was published in German reporting the project results [18] in general, though not
including the model presented in this paper.
Action research can also use the same data analysis techniques as other kinds of
qualitative research, though these individual analyses are situated within the overall
framework of the action research cycle. We used an iterative process to develop inferences
about the process of competency rallying. Each cycle began with a diagnosis of the current
state of the project Virtuelle Fabrik inspired by the data and literature. Then, to see if this
diagnosis could be supported, we developed an action plan, which was cooperatively
implemented by the researchers and managers. The results of the intervention were observed
and evaluated to see if the predictions were supported. These evaluations led us to discover
complementary perspectives and facets of the process of competency rallying. As the
priorities of the project shifted, we modified or maintained each inference about the process.
Informal discussions and formal reporting of the project led to specification of the learning
and to the next round of action learning. Finally, we wrote up our inferences about the
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various aspects of the process, adding conceptual arguments, additional examples and
citations to relevant literature. Table 2 summarizes the evidence from the project that grounds
our process theory of competency rallying.
Insert Table 2 about here
A process theory of competency rallying
Based on our analysis of the data from the project, we suggest that competency
rallying involved four related sets of organizational activities, specifically: 1) identification
and development of distinctive competencies in network members, 2) identification and
facing of short-term market opportunities, 3) marshalling competencies from network
partners for a particular market opportunity and 4) a short-term cooperative effort. The theory
is summarized in Figure 1. The first two phases are performed on an on-going basis within
the relatively stable network of firms in the Virtual Factory. These phases draw on
competencies and market opportunities from a variety of industries, as indicated symbolically
by the grey boxes. The final two phases are performed dynamically for each individual
project.
Insert Figure 1 about here
For example, consider the development of the electric retraction device for a steering
wheel, a product engineered and built within the Virtual Factory. The manufacturing project
started when one of the network members, Wiftech, was approached by a customer and asked
if they could provide the part. Wiftech itself did not have the capacity to build the part, but
offered instead to take the project to the network, an example of facing a market opportunity,
which would have been impossible without the project. Wiftech benefited by satisfying an
important customer, as well as from a small piece of the final production. Wiftech passed the
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project on to a project leader from another firm, with whom they were acquainted from
various project meetings. The project leader evaluated ten different technologies from ten
independent firms in the network for technological feasibility and for their cost in the effort
to design the part, an example of marshalling competencies. While ten companies were
involved in the search for a technical solution, only three were involved in designing and
manufacturing the first prototypes. The joint work of these companies at this stage is an
example of a short-term cooperative effort. Final production required different partners, as
the order quantities did not fit the one-of-a-kind manufacturing philosophy of the prototype
manufacturers. Unstated in this example, but clearly necessary, were the on-going processes
for developing and maintaining the competencies necessary to design and manufacture such a
part in the first place.
Process vs. variance theories
In the terms used by Mohr [19], our theory is a process theory rather than the more
typical variance theory. Variance theories comprise constructs or variables and propositions
or hypotheses linking them. Such theories predict the levels of dependent or outcome
variables from the levels of independent or predictor variables, where the predictors are seen
as necessary and sufficient for the outcomes. Rather than relating levels of variables, process
theories explain how outcomes of interest develop through a sequence of events [19]. These
precursors are necessary for the outcome, but not sufficient in themselves, and outcomes are
therefore only partially predictable from knowledge of the process. Mohr gives the example
of a process theory of catching malaria. “The necessary conditions are the malarial parasite,
persons already harboring the parasite, and Anopheles mosquitoes”. It is the combination of
these elements that may lead to another infection, not the value of any single factor. The
order of the events is also clearly important: a mosquito must bite an infected person before
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biting an uninfected person, not the other way around. Finally, the outcome is not inevitable,
but can instead be a matter of chance. Being bitten by a mosquito does not inevitably lead to
malaria. Still, Mohr notes that the laws of chance are still laws, and that process theories
describe regularity in a probabilistic sense. For example, a known percentage of mosquito
bites may lead to infection.
Our process theory explains how projects are identified and delivered in turbulent
environments. Facing short-term market opportunities and developing long-term
competencies within the network are two necessary preconditions for the organizational
processes of marshalling competencies for a short-term cooperative effort. The theory
explains the success of projects in terms of joining and separation of the two necessary
conditions, as the two processes of recombination and co-operative effort.
For the purposes of this paper, we present competency creation, market facing,
competency marshalling and cooperative effort as linear and distinct phases of the process.
We present the theory in this way because it fits our data reasonably well and provides a
simple and analytically useful way of presenting our theory. It should be understood that the
process was usually not as clear and simple as the theory might imply. Phases could not
always be clearly distinguished for particular manufacturing projects. In particular, as you
move backward in the process, the time scale of the phases increases and their scope expands
from a particular manufacturing project to the overall operation of the network.
Phase 1: Identification and development of competencies
The network rallies competencies provided by independent partner firms in the
network. These firms can provide competencies from their various industries (as indicated
symbolically by the grey boxes in Figure 1) that are potentially valuable yet not exploited in
other industries. This view corresponds with the stream of literature on the resource-based
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view of the firm, which describes firms as collections of resources that can be deployed to
establish competitive positions in multiple markets with heterogeneous products [20-22].
Even though the resource-based view is a theory of the firm, singular, it proved adaptable to
the identification of resources from the network of firms involved in the Virtual Factory.
Through the course of the project, the conception of resources in the Virtual Factory
gradually evolved and expanded. Initially, the view was quite limited: the original goal of the
project was to increase machine utilization, so resources were machines. Descriptions of
these machines across the industries were based on the generally accepted classification
scheme and terminology from the DIN 8580 standard, which defines all possible machining
operations.
Defining resources makes direct comparison across business or industry boundaries
possible. It also led in some case to a rethinking of the meaning of resources. For example,
two companies were experts in grinding in their respective industries. When one contracted
work to the other though, they discovered that one of them was much cheaper than the other,
a fact the companies could not have discovered through benchmarking only within their own
industry. This discovery led to a revision in thinking about resources. Rather than viewing
them as undifferentiated commodities, the view shifted instead to competencies: something
one firm was better at doing than others. The second company was forced to reconsider its
competencies, and determined that they lay in grinding smaller-sized parts and to more
precise tolerances, which made them more expensive in that particular case, but able to do
work that the other firm could not. In other words, in order to participate in the network,
companies had to more clearly identify what competencies they could contribute.
Experiences of cooperative manufacturing also revealed services that were not linked
to machine tools but which were equally important for successful projects. These capabilities
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were needed to back the network’s competency to design and engineer complete customer
solutions. Examples included assembly competency, quality inspection and testing
capabilities, project management or certification for ISO conformity. These capabilities
required complex combinations of information technology (for CAD, CAE), testing devices,
skilled engineers or accreditation. Unlike simple machining operations, competencies
discovered in this way are to a great extent intangible. There are no generally accepted
definitions that can be used to describe the distinctive competencies the network could bring
to bear on customer problems.
One important benefit of the project was that experiences within the project
contributed to the further development of competencies within the partner firms. Companies
faced requirements from a range of different industries and customer projects, which placed
considerable stretch on their existing skills. Managers began to refer to this stretch as the
“jogging effect”, meaning that the little time they spent manufacturing for the network led to
a greater increase in the fitness of the firm.
As well as within the individual member companies, competencies were developed at
the level of the network as a whole. From experiences with joint manufacturing projects,
stable sub-networks of partners emerged, which as a group proved to have competencies for
applications, for example, in medical technology or precision machinery. In building these
networks the Virtual Factory contributed to a trend of co-specialization of the partners. Some
firms decided to give up certain technologies for which they found reliable partners in the
network and to concentrate on other technologies which proved to be competitive over a
wider range of industries.
In summary, the Virtual Factory project relied upon member firms’ competencies,
which are conceptualized as something one firm can do better than others. In order to
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contribute to the network, companies had to first clearly identify and further develop their
competencies.
Phase II: Identification and facing of market opportunities
The Virtual Factory provided its member firms with market opportunities beyond
their core businesses and industries, again as indicated symbolically by the grey boxes in
Figure 1. The conception of identifying and facing market opportunities evolved through the
course of the project. Initially, the understanding was simply market access, an important
element in other networks where companies are not equally situated in terms of access to
profitable opportunities. However, market opportunities do not present themselves neatly
labelled as such. Instead, accommodating short-term market opportunities requires active
entrepreneurial creation of business on the level of the partner firms as well as on the level of
the network, which we refer to together as market facing.
Penrose [23, p. 31] argues that the market opportunity of a firm “comprises all
productive possibilities that its ‘entrepreneurs’ see and can take advantage of”. Her central
argument is that the growth of the firm is limited by the managerial services available for
creating market opportunities. These services encompass competencies of the management
team such as its “entrepreneurial versatility”, “fundraising ingenuity”, “ambition” or
“entrepreneurial judgement”. Obviously, limits to entrepreneurial services exist particularly
for the partners in the Virtual Factory, who are either internally-oriented production
departments or small and medium sized firms, where highly specialized management re-
sources are particularly scarce.
Explicit market facing took time to develop. The majority of manufacturing projects
in the first two years of the project were carried out for customers from inside the network.
Some manufacturing projects had served external customers, but these usually occurred by
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chance or were initiated by the customer. The research project worked nearly exclusively on
how to organize work in the network, so market-facing was a matter for the individual
partner firm. Experience and early success in manufacturing projects showed that the Virtual
Factory was also successful with products that were not fully specified and for which the
firms could use their engineering capabilities. To take advantage of these competencies, the
project leaders promoted facing markets outside the network. Advances from the inward
orientation to outside marketing were made in the third year of the action research project.
Organizational routines for facing market opportunities on the level of the network
were initially developed as an adoption of existing product marketing techniques for the
marketing of production competencies. For example, purchasing criteria were identified that
could be used to signal the uniqueness and the buyer value of resources from the network.
Mapping these purchasing criteria on market segments and customers resulted in a number of
target segments for which sub-networks of firms developed marketing plans. Exposure to
new business opportunities raised awareness of market facing among the managers involved.
A saying became common among them: “Market opportunities are like trains that run again
and again through the station. To catch the train, you have to practice jumping on trains, not
construct new stations”.
In summary, identification of market opportunities provided member companies with
access to applications for their manufacturing competencies in businesses beyond their
traditional industry boundaries. Membership in the network exposed the firms to ideas and
demands they would otherwise not have seen. Selecting business opportunities, as we have
seen from the action interventions, requires more than simple picking them off the shelf.
Instead, it is necessary for managers to be able and willing to perceive opportunities to stretch
competencies beyond their primary business.
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Phase III: Marshalling competencies
In the structure of the process theory, developing competencies and facing market
opportunities represent two necessary preconditions in the network of firms. However, they
are not in themselves sufficient to address a customer’s need. Central to the success of
projects in turbulent environments is the quick combination and recombination of the
competencies necessary for a particular market opportunity. In order to meet this need,
members of the Virtual Factory project developed routines for marshalling competencies, that
is, to determine what competencies from which partner companies are required for a specific
customer’s request.
Again, the conception of marshalling evolved over the course of the project. Initial
activities were based on literature suggesting that markets would be an efficient means of
allocating resources to evolving market opportunities without hierarchical overhead or central
management [24]. For example, Miles and Snow [25, 26] suggest that such market
mechanisms will become more important for marshalling competencies with the use of
information systems that reveal the status of potential trading partner (a full-disclosure
system). A shift towards market coordination through computer systems also concurs with
the predictions of transaction cost economics [27, 28]. In accordance with these suggestions,
a full-disclosure information system, the so-called “Technology Capacity Bourse”, was
developed in the early stages of the project. This database provided descriptions of the
machine tools available in each of the member companies. The goal of the system was to
reduce the cost of searching for partners and specifying competencies.
The system served its purpose until the partners attempted to include real-time
capacity information to automate competencies marshalling. At that point, action reflection
revealed that managers of the partner companies were not prepared to make decisions solely
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based on information from the database. This was especially true for many of the intangible
competencies developed in the network that could not be described as succinctly and
unambiguously as the physical resources (e.g., engineering or integration competencies).
Because of the difficulty of describing such competencies, a simple database was out of the
question in any case.
Instead of relying on technology, organizational routines for marshalling
competencies had to be developed. The researchers analyzed early experiences of
manufacturing projects to identify problematic situations. Small teams of managers and
researchers then developed what the project partners called the “rules of the game”. Each rule
was presented to all Virtual Factory partners and a formal vote taken on adding it to the set of
guidelines for collaboration. These guidelines eventually covered the entire lifecycle of a co-
operative manufacturing project and concerned for example how partners are selected, how
prices are calculated co-operatively, a checklist of how to specify customer products, and a
standard contract.
In addition, the researchers drew on literature to describe the complementary roles
and positions of cooperating partners. Consideration of these functions led to the
specification of a set of roles to ensure that the skills needed for a successful manufacturing
project were provided. One firm might fill different roles (or even multiple roles) for
different manufacturing projects, as long as it was clear who was responsible for each role
and all were filled.
Apart from those explicit guidelines, mutual site visits and experiences from joint
production projects contributed to shared knowledge about the competencies and priorities of
individual partner firms in the network. This body of shared knowledge formed what some
have called a knowledge market [29]. Frequent informal social contacts, such as the “virtual
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dinner” provided a business platform for marshalling competencies on a self-organized, ad
hoc basis. Other authors have documented similar networks that seem to operate without a
central design agency, such as industrial districts in Italy [10] and the film industry in
Hollywood [30]. These cases are similarly reported to have culturally embedded restructuring
mechanisms independent of any central institution.
Based on the mutual knowledge of partners’ competencies that they had acquired
during the project meetings and site visits, managers chose to use personal contact to directly
settle technical issues. In fact, the database was regarded more as a means to establish a first
contact (yellow pages), while placing orders was based on the personal contact, thus limiting
the role of the database. Kumar, et al. [10] similarly report the failure of an information
system for transaction management in the Prato region, which they attribute to a mismatch
between the economic rationality of the system and the need of the managers to build trust
and a relationship with the companies with whom they interacted.
Phase IV: Short-term cooperative effort
Rallying competencies requires that multiple partners temporarily unite to combine
their forces in a concentrated effort to create a new solution for a customer. The fourth step in
the process theory addresses the question of how management can facilitate and elicit “the
willingness of individuals to contribute force to the cooperative system” [31, p.83]. There
were several issues that had to be addressed.
Firstly, the project leaders had to address the development of cooperative processes to
allow companies to give and take business at a reasonable cost. Evaluation of initial projects
for customers from inside the project partners showed that the additional coordination among
independent firms led to roughly 30% higher cost than would have been the case for a
manufacturing project performed within a single firm. Firms therefore engaged in the
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reengineering of firm-boundary-spanning processes to make cooperation within the network
as efficient as in-company processes, for which supply chain management techniques could
be used [32]. Duplicate activities—such as repeated quality inspection each time a part
crossed a firm’s boundary, filling out a full set of shipping papers and purchase orders, or
work preparation and entering the workload in the next firm’s electronic planning
systems—were traced and eliminated. Of course, elimination of these activities also removed
an important set of safeguards against mistakes and opportunism by partners. For this type of
cooperation to work, expectations for the performance of the work moved from control at the
transaction level to controls at the level of the network, without, however, giving up the
partners’ independence. Companies had to agree to follow the procedural guidelines that the
project leaders derived from experiences with earlier manufacturing projects.
Second, direct communication was established between the involved operators in the
Virtual Factory project, avoiding chain-of-command communication. For example, partner
companies created dedicated liaison positions with the ability to by-pass normal business
processes for network business or allowed an out-sourcing firm to contact machine operators
directly. Consequently, expectations of what individual employees would do changed. For
many operators, work for the Virtual Factory included external contact for the first time,
forcing them to build skills in communication or conflict resolution. Of course, empowering
production staff to accept work for the firm has the potential for conflict between their
decisions and the traditional hierarchical control of the company and work processes.
Third, in the course of the project, short-term cooperation increasingly shifted
towards substantial arrangements. The established guidelines, for example, covered the
context of cooperation, e.g. the process of acceptance of new partners by the network, the
process of specifying customer products, the process of calculation of cost, and the
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communication processes in the network. On the other hand, direct procedural arrangements
to control transaction were declined by the partner firms. For example, after the discussion of
several proposals, it was decided that a guideline for the allocation of resources within
partner firms was not required. Instead, the managers agreed that work could be delegated
within the network, but not the responsibility for its quality, timeliness and cost. In other
words, rather than having a rule for how to allocate resources, it was the explicit agreement
of the managers to leave open how commitments were met, as long as they were.
This focus on substantial rather than procedural cooperation resembles the
particularities of the craft industrial mode. As Piore and Sabel [8] explain with the example
of the construction industry, manufacturing projects are too short-lived, firms too unstable
and employment too ephemeral for time-consuming process of grievance arbitration.
Moreover, individual customer-defined projects vary too much to justify the establishment of
arbitration systems which are unlikely to have any bearing on the facts of future conflict.
Unlike mass production, this mode of working requires the collaboration between workers
and managers. Since the work is always based on a unique design, problem-solving is a trial
and error process based on the craftsman’s experience. It is therefore not surprising that
organizational units are small and supported by personal leadership. Improvements are based
on the ingenuity and creativity of the individual and his technical excellence, which is
challenged by the customer’s desire.
Discussion
Two characteristics strike us as key to understanding the success of the Virtual
Factory project, although further research would be valuable. A first characteristic is the
nature of the product created in the network. The project started with the goal of trading
commodity manufacturing, but it turned out that the network performed best for products
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requiring intensive engineering, for which intensive interaction between customer and
designers and among designers is necessary. In short, the process summarized in Figure 1
worked best for cases where marshalling of competencies and cooperation mattered. On the
other hand, for standard, off-the-shelf products, the degree of customized effort represented
in this process is probably inappropriate. Instead, for these products an electronic market
might be useful to lower transaction costs and enable customers to locate low-cost suppliers.
A possible research question then is how companies can develop procurement processes and
criteria to decide when to purchase from an electronic market and when to seek the
specialized services of a Virtual Factory.
Secondly, the partners in the Virtual Factory project operate in turbulent
environments, meaning that the environment, and in particular the demands of the market,
changed more rapidly than the strategies and competencies of the companies can change. It
was necessary for these companies to search for new market opportunities where they could
apply their competencies and to be able to marshal collections of competencies, including
competencies from other firms, in order to satisfy these market opportunities. Turbulence is
characteristic of industries where market demand is uncertain or where technologies are
rapidly evolving. Jones [33] have identified demand uncertainty, task complexity, human
asset specificity and frequency as factors leading to the need for network governance.
Describing Silicon Valley, Saxenian [34] showed how production networks among computer
systems companies spread the risks of developing new technologies. Similarly, in the
Hollywood film industry, agents provide access for actors to new films [35].
In a more stable environment, where innovation is less critical, some of the steps we
have described may be unnecessary. For example, in Prato, where the production processes
are well-understood, explicit marshalling of competencies seems to be less necessary.
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Impannatore do not need to know the details of the production chain; instead, they pick an
initial firm, which can in turn place further work. However, we speculate that even in stable
environments the processes we have described may be useful. Miles and Snow [36] point out
that dynamic networks—likely arenas for competencies rallying—offer firms additional
strategic options. Competency rallying makes firms more agile, able to respond quickly to
customer requests. Organizations that are practiced at the process we have described should
be able to change very rapidly since they are constantly changing anyway. An important
research question here is to identify and describe appropriate control mechanisms for firms
that are constantly on the edge of instability.
Consideration of the case suggests that there are some important preconditions for its
success, only some of which are fully understood and controlled by the project leadership.
Many others were implicit in the industrial district, and created and reinforced by other
means, such as common training, past interactions, etc. Other researchers have documented
empirical evidence for such processes in industrial districts such as Prato [10] or the watch
industry in Switzerland. In these areas, extensive socialization mechanisms have been
developed, for example, professional schools, professional associations, institutions,
governance structures and traditions [8]. In other words, while the manufacturing projects
undertaken by the network are only short-term, commitment to the network and the industry
is long-term. The failure of other networks may be attributable in part to an absence of these
factors, which led to suspicion and mistrust among the partners, disinterest and eventual
disintegration of the network [37].
Further research might consider what factors are necessary for the success of a
cooperative venture such as the Virtual Factory project, and how these factors are realized.
Many of these factors are regional and specific. Given that information technology makes
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cooperation possible on a global scale, future research might consider how (or indeed, if)
absence of local factors can be overcome and cooperation extended globally.
Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a process theory of competency rallying, that is, of the
process of developing and bringing together in temporary cooperation a network of firms
with the competencies needed to satisfy a newly-identified market opportunity. Our theory
hypothesizes that competency rallying consists of four related sets of organizational
activities, specifically: 1) identification and development of distinctive competencies in
network members, 2) identification and facing of short-term market opportunities,
3) marshalling competencies from network partners for a particular market opportunity and
4) a short-term cooperative effort. The basic building blocks of our process theory have been
discussed before, but our theory is novel in the way that it weaves together an external
perspective on market-facing with an internal perspective on competency development and
marshalling to describe the overall process of competency rallying.
The purpose of an action research study such as the one reported here is to guide and
inspire new ideas and practices rather than systematically testing existing theories. Our
theory of competency rallying suggests that performance of firms in turbulent environments
should be studied by considering both how these firms face the novel market opportunities
and how they marshal competencies to attack these opportunities. Study of these rallying
processes generalizes the concept of agility beyond its origins in the reallocation of mainly
physical resources. Competency rallying offers a perspective on sustainable firm
performance based on the mastering of organizational routines of change rather than static
positions of competitive advantage.
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The extent to which our local explanation of competency rallying in turbulent
environments, summarized in Figure 1, develops into a more general theory depends on how
well it works in other settings. One of the first questions for future research is whether or not
the process of competency rallying in other settings resembles our model, or whether the
model is unique to the Virtual Factory project. One approach to answering this question is to
apply well-known theory-testing techniques. For example, a large-scale survey of networks
could be attempted to statistically replicate this model. A problem with this approach is the
difficulty of identifying functioning networks, since unlike firms, they do not appear in
directories with contact addresses, ready to be sampled. Another approach would be a meta-
analysis of existing case descriptions of networks, although there are obvious difficulties with
this approach also.
For an action research project, it may be more meaningful to ask how the experiences
of this project can influence further action. In this sense, replication of the Virtual Factory
project is already underway, as other groups are building similar networks in their own
regions and industries. One such example can be found in the construction industry in
Switzerland. Four other networks in precision machining are operating or planned in the
regions around Bern and Basel, Switzerland and Augsburg and Aachen, Germany. One of
these groups has already informally reported a significant backlog of orders for the network.
These groups have adopted the Virtual Factory processes and, though independent, are
working with the Virtual Factory research team. Clearly, the interest of these groups in
replicating the Virtual Factory project is an indication of its success in changing peoples’
mindsets about the value of such cooperative networks. Their experiences will be a valuable
replication of our results.
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Figures and Tables
Table 1. Examples of manufacturing projects worked on by the Virtual Factory.
Manufacturing
Project
Description of Product Description of competency rallying
1 Mechanism to
electrically
retract a car
steering wheel
The mechanism targets a market
of less than 10.000 items a year
and is therefore not interesting to
auto suppliers used to lot sizes of
hundreds of thousands.
It is technically challenging, as it
has to meet safety standards of
auto industry at competitive
manufacturing cost.
The network was prepared to face such
opportunities, responding within two
days to the customer request
To marshal the best competencies, ten
potential technologies were identified.
In a co-operative effort with the
customer engineering changes were
implemented and prototypes
manufactured.
2 Large
precision base
for tool machine
The base was a 20-mm sheet
metal, roughly 1m x 1.5-m in size.
More than 300 holes were needed
for the assembly of all
mechanisms of the tool machine.
Placement of the holes defined the
machine’s precision. The piece
was too big for most machines.
Alternative technologies such as
drilling, laser drilling, and water
drilling were identified and compared.
Marshalling of a large dimension tool
machine, on which the piece could be
machined in one fixing. Value created
was quality improvement (because of
one fixing), and 75 % cost reduction.
3 Module for a
letter sorting
machine
The manufacturing of a module of
an industrial postal letter sorting
machines that was fully
engineered. To meet short
delivery deadlines, the
manufacturer needed additional
manufacturing capacity. The
module was structured in
mechanical and electrical
subassemblies, and painted sheet
metal as the cover and stand.
Competencies from the network. E.g.
controller manufacturing for textile
machines, and sheet metal
manufacturing and painting from
furniture industry were marshaled for
the customer project.
A short-term co-operative effort
undertaken with the customer to
achieve a frictionless integration of
mechanical and electrical subsystems
of the module.
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Table 1, continued.
Manufacturing
Project
Description of Product Description of competency rallying
4 Air-
conditioning
unit
The concept of an air-
conditioning unit, fitting a
demand pocket in the upper
range of the market was
engineered and manufactured
as a project lasting about two
years.
During a presentation of the Virtual
Factory project an engineer in the
audience revealed having a product
concept and asked the necessary
competencies to be marshaled from the
network. On stage, project members
analyzed the idea and proposed an initial
architecture of contributions from three
partners.
Business was agreed, in a cooperative
effort with the customer the unit was
engineered, prototyped and 50 copies
manufactured after 18 month, further
orders are pending.
5 Fifteen end of
life-cycle
industrial
products such as
slides, fans,
necks and
nozzles
At the beginning of the
project, old, simple to
manufacture and fully
specified products with a low
known annual demand were
given to the network, because
these were assumed to best fit
a spot market for idle
capacity.
The products were partially successful
where direct cost effects were achievable
with resources better fitting the
manufacturing task. Due to already
assumed learning effects in the long life
cycle, effects however remained small.
Indirect effects were observed where
outsourcing opened disinvestment
opportunities of constantly underutilized
resources.
6 Re-
engineering
stability of a
large sun-
umbrella
Finite element simulation
competency of an engineering
firm in the network was used
to improve wind stability of
large restaurant umbrellas
marketed by a textile
manufacturer.
The network was prepared to face market
opportunities from outside its companies’
core-businesses. The network’s brokers
channeled a customer request from textile
industry to highly specialized
competencies available in a firm from the
mechanical industry.
